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Abstract: We use experimental data from 35 randomly selected communities in Burundi to examine 
the impact of exposure to conflict on social-, risk- and time preferences.  These types of preferences 
are important as they determine people’s propensity to invest and their ability to overcome social 
dilemmas, so that changes therein foster or hinder economic growth.  We find that conflict affects 
preferences.  Individuals that have been exposed to greater levels of violence display more altruistic 
behavior towards their neighbors, are more risk seeking, and have higher discount rates.  Adverse, but 
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Civil wars are associated with the destruction of capital, the breakdown of social norms and a 
reduced ability of people to “cope” with adverse conditions (e.g. Collier 2003, Fearon and 
Latin 2003).  While the speed of recovery following conflict is subject of debate, the 
conventional view is that wars are “development in reverse.”  This message emerges from 
both cross-country studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2008, Cerra and Saxena 2008) as well as from 
much of the micro level research (e.g., Deininger 2003, Verwimp 2005, Barron et al. 2009, 
Do and Iyer 2009).  This comes as no surprise—deaths and injuries, destroyed infrastructure 
and assets, displaced populations, and deterioration of institutions all seem to work together to 
push households into poverty.  However, recent evidence suggests this is only part of the 
picture. 
A number of African countries have experienced remarkable post-war recovery after 
civil war.  Examples include Mozambique, Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda.  Undoubtedly, this 
is partly due to generous aid flows that typically follow the cessation of violence.  But other 
mechanisms may be at play too.  Heterodox social scientists have long argued that violence 
can carry the seed of societal reform, spurring the expansion of capitalism and promoting 
economic growth.  For example, Cramer (2006) points to historical events to support his 
claim that violence can “produce institutional changes, amendments to the rule of the game.  
In retrospect, many changes that come to be seen as progressive have their origins in social 
conflicts that have taken a violent turn.  Herein lies a paradox of violence and war: violence 
destroys but is also often associated with social creativity.”  Interestingly, a small literature is 
now emerging that appears consistent with this perspective.  Blattman (2009) shows that 
political participation in Uganda is greater, and that community networks are more extensive, 
in areas that have experienced violence.  Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009) find similar results 
in Sierra Leone.    
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One possible interpretation consistent with this evidence is that exposure to conflict 
induces a shift in preferences.  This explanation challenges economic theory as economists 
regard preferences as exogenous and fixed in their straw man model of Homo economicus (at 
least in the short-term––see below).  The notion of endogenous, or context-dependent, 
preferences gnaws at the foundations of standard welfare theory.  Yet, some evidence 
suggests that preferences can change in the short term.  For example, Robson (2002) discusses 
adaptive utility in the context of relative consumption – the appreciation of a consumption 
bundle depends on consumption levels relative to those of peers.  In this study we aim to 
explore the issue of endogenous preferences, allowing for the possibility that exposure to 
conflict has shaped preferences. 
Interestingly, there is little opposition against the concept of “malleable preferences” 
in other social sciences.  Indeed, in psychology it is widely accepted that (temporary) shocks 
can permanently affect somebody’s outlook on life, as well as his subjective valuation of 
goods and services (Hobfoll 1989, Tedeschi et al. 1998).  Shocks may not only have an 
impact on political motivations and social preferences, but also on other preferences, 
including those pertaining to evaluating risk and discounting the future.  Since such 
preferences are fundamental determinants of consumption, saving and investment behavior –– 
the drivers of economic growth –– it appears as if the notion of endogenous preferences can 
have far-reaching consequences for how we think about development.  For example, a shock 
that makes people prefer the present rather than the future will discourage saving, and thereby 
lower long-term income.  Shocks that attenuate preferences for social interaction and 
collaboration may erode social capital and make communities less resilient against future 
shocks (undermining joint insurance) or hamper the provision of growth-enhancing public 
goods.  If so, dynamic trajectories of development need to be rethought.  Particularly, the 
scope for vicious and virtuous development cycles will be radically altered—if adverse  
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shocks invite anti-social preferences or discourage savings, then temporary shocks can 
condemn communities to trajectories into poverty trap type of outcomes. 
  The main objective of this paper is to examine the causal effect of exposure to 
violence on behavior in economic experiments in which payoffs vary between choices across 
three dimensions: timing, riskiness, and social consequences.  Do victims of conflict behave 
more pro-socially, do they have a higher propensity to invest in the future, and are they more 
prone to taking risks?  We try to answer this important question by pulling together survey 
and new experimental data from Burundi.  First, we collected detailed information on the 
(local) history of violence in a set of Burundian communities, and on a range of household 
and community variables.  We then conducted a series of artefactual field experiments, 
playing games believed to gauge risk -, time -, and social preferences in an incentive–
compatible fashion.  While such preferences have been measured in a variety of contexts (see 
Carpenter and Cardenas 2008 for a review), this study is the first to apply experimental 
methods in a post-conflict environment to gauge the effect of violence on human decision-
making. We are aware of potential concerns about the endogeneity of exposure to violence, 
omitted variables and non-random attrition, and probe the robustness of our findings using 
various additional analyses, including an instrumental variable approach.   
Our results strongly suggest that exposure to violence affects behavior – possibly via 
altering preferences.  We find that individuals who have either experienced violence 
themselves, or who live in communities that have been violently attacked, display more 
altruistic behavior, are more risk seeking, and act less patiently.  Our results are robust across 
several specifications, and are obtained for both experimental and observational data.  We 
believe they shed important new light on post-war recovery processes by speaking against 
overly pessimistic views on the destructive long-term consequences of civil war.    
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This paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we sketch two perspectives on the 
malleability of human preferences.  In section 3 we discuss our data and experiments, and 
outline our identification strategy (including the way in which we address endogeneity 
issues).  In section 4 we present our main experimental results and aim to interpret them in the 
context of conventional economic assumptions with respect to behavior.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Preferences and Behavior 
The canonical model of utility maximization in economics assumes that preferences are given.  
But preferences are not written in stone – a rich economic literature has developed that tries to 
capture the evolutionary processes behind the long-term selection of time preferences (e.g., 
Rogers 1994, Robson and Samuelson 2007, Netzer 2009), risk preferences (Netzer 2009) and 
social preferences (Bowles 2009).
7  Evolutionary models of preference selection provide an 
equilibrium match between behavior and the environment within which people reside (for 
overview work, see Robson 2001, 2002).  Given the long-term nature of evolutionary 
processes, though, the notion of endogenous preferences thus defined does not really 
challenge the mainstream economics paradigm.  Specifically, preferences may still be treated 
as hard-wired and fixed for individuals.   
There is also research that documents systematic differences across communities that 
may be explained by changes taking place at much shorter time scales, such as changes in 
physical environments or technologies.  For example, cross-section experimental work by 
Henrich et al. (2001, 2004) documents behavioral variation across societies, arguing that this 
variation can be reasonably well explained by the geographical and social context – including 
economic variables such as the degree to which individuals are integrated into markets.   
However, correlation between variables like market integration on the one hand and social or 
                                                 
7 For other work on the evolution of preferences via selection, see Hanson and Stuart (1990) and Eaton and 
Eswaran (2003).  For a critical approach towards the conventional economic model of stable preferences, see 
Ariely et al. (2003).  
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risk preferences on the other hand need not capture a causal effect.  Self selection into 
(market) activities suggests that the reverse may be true as well – certain “types” of 
individuals are more likely to engage in market exchange than others.  Such endogeneity 
concerns imply that it is not straightforward to challenge the canonical model of fixed 
preferences. 
Psychologists sometimes have difficulty grasping the economist’s perspective on 
behavior.  Indeed, their standard framework does not contain the equivalent of exogenous 
preferences.  Rather, individuals are believed to have a flexible repertoire of states and traits, 
enabling them to formulate context-specific coping strategies.  The distinction between 
personality traits (characteristics)
8 and states (context-dependent behavior, see McCrae and 
Costa, 1997) appears to reflect the economist’s distinction between preferences and behavior, 
but this is only superficially so.  While traits are relatively stable over time and across 
situations, they can profoundly change in response to traumatic events (as do coping strategies 
and states).  The consensus view among psychologists is that a shock, such as civil war, may 
result in either temporal (“non-chronic”) or permanent changes (“chronic” or “personality” 
changes or disorders) in behavior (McCrae 2006).  This is true even if the experience was not 
first hand (Yehunda 2002).  Whether a trauma develops into a personality change, or not, 
depends on various factors (de Jong 2002).
9  Yet, if people overcome adversity they may be 
propelled to a higher level of functioning than prior to the event (Linley and Joseph 2004). 
Such posttraumatic “growth” has been observed under victims of a wide range of tragedies 
such as rape, cancer, heart attacks, disasters, combat and the Holocaust (e.g., Tedeschi et al. 
1998, Carmil and Breznitz 1991, Punamaki et al. 1997).   
                                                 
8 Five personality traits are commonly identified: openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion and neuroticism. 
9 Such factors include (i) the magnitude and intensity of the event, (ii) demographic characteristics of the 
individual (age, gender, socio-economic status, education, preparedness, religion and ethnicity), (iii) the 
subjective appraisal of the event (whether a person perceives the event as positive or negative and whether a 
person feels capable of mastering the impact of the event), (iv) the resources available to the person and the 
social support networks around a person, and (v) the coping behavior of an individual, both problem oriented and 
emotional effort to deal with the event’s impact.  
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  Exposure to traumatic events, including attacks on the community, can augment the 
value individuals place on people around them.  Collins et al. (1990) show that the 
“recognition of one’s vulnerability” may enhance the value of social networks.  Also, 
psychologists have pointed out that the disruption of support networks is a key damaging 
aspect of traumatic events (de Jong 2002).  If violence disrupts communities, through 
permanent displacement or ethnic tensions, the breakdown of social support networks may 
occur. 
What about risk preferences?  The psychological literature also offers some clues on 
how risk preferences might be affected by shocks.  The core idea is that human emotions and 
behavior are affected by traumatic shocks (Cutchin et al. 2008) even when the experience is 
not first hand (Weinstein 1989). These emotions in turn affect people’s risk evaluations in 
situations subsequent and unrelated to the traumatic event (Lerner and Keltner 2001), yielding 
ambiguous predictions with respect to experimental play.  Specifically, when trauma has 
induced feelings of anger, respondents are more likely to make optimistic risk evaluations and 
are more prone to choosing risky options (Lerner and Keltner 2001).  In contrast, when the 
trauma has induced feelings of fear, respondents are more likely to avoid risky options.  It is 
an open question which effect dominates. 
Time preferences may also be affected by exposure to conflict.  Traumatic events may 
raise the subjective appreciation of the risk of being exposed to trauma again in the future 
(Lerner and Keltner 2001), and experiencing a shock often induces self-protective behavior in 
survivors (Weinstein 1989).  Hence, exposure to conflict may induce hazard preparedness in 
people, skewing asset portfolios towards assets that can easily be hidden or moved.  If so, 
exposure to violence should make our respondents seek immediate returns over future ones, 
raising discount rates as measured in experimental play.   
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However, the difficulty in identifying the causal effect of conflict on preferences is 
evident.  As mentioned, one key concern is potential endogeneity of exposure to conflict with 
respect to preferences due to (self) selection effects.  Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish 
true preference shifts from information effects––which would be perfectly compatible with 
the mainstream model of fixed preferences.  If people care more about their fellow survivors 
than before the conflict, preferences have shifted.  However, if people learn during conflict 
that certain modes of behavior are more functional than others, this may induce them to adopt 
new heuristics—possibly more cooperative ones.  Conflict may teach community members 
that altruistic behavior pays (or does not pay) because fellow villagers (fail to) reciprocate in 
times of need.  Alternatively, conflict may help people discover what their true preferences 
are, as it forces them to reflect on the essence of living.  That is, preferences may be a stable 
but fuzzy and multidimensional construct, so that identifying them takes effort (Bateman et al. 
2008).  We return to this in section 4.2. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Data  
We conducted our series of experiments in a random and stratified sample of 300 households 
in 35 communities. These communities and households were drawn from a set of 100 
communities that we visited in 2007 to collect data on local conflict, social capital and a range 
of household and community variables.
10  The data gathering effort was part of a larger 
project, initiated by the World Bank, who collected the first wave of data halfway through  the 
war (in 1998).  For a total of 1400 households in 100 communities we have panel data 
regarding many important household characteristics as well as information on the 
                                                 
10 Burundi Priority Survey 2007. The data collection was a collaborative effort between the Institut de 
Statistiques et d’Etudes Economiques du Burundi (ISTEEBU), Antwerp University, Brussels University and 
Wageningen University, and was implemented under the flag of MICROCON – an EU funded project focusing 
on household 
analysis of violent conflict in various regions of the world.  
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development and consequences of armed conflict.  We randomly selected 35 communities and 
revisited all respondents of the earlier surveys, inviting them to participate in a series of 
experiments.  Of the 35 communities, 24 experienced violence in the period 1993-2003
11, and 
11 were not exposed to violence.  Table 1 summarizes our main data. 
Our starting point is the assumption that there are no systematic differences between 
our subjects before the onset of conflict.  That is, we assume our 300 participants are drawn 
from the same distribution of preferences in the Burundi population.  Next, we test whether 
exposure to violence is random – the odds of an individual being subjected to violence are 
independent of variables like wealth, education, etc.  Following anecdotal evidence (HRW 
1998, Krueger and Krueger 2008, Voors and Bulte 2008), our null hypothesis is that violence 
is not systematically related to individual characteristics.  Our data do not allow us to reject 
this null—see below.  Hence, we can think about exposure to violence during the 1993-2003 
conflict as a quasi-experiment, enabling identification of the effects of the “conflict treatment” 
–– systematic differences in experimental play between communities can be attributed to 
exposure to conflict.  
We measure civil war shocks at both the household and community level. Since 
independence Burundi has been the stage of nearly three decades of civil war between the 
country’s two main ethnic groups; Hutu and Tutsi. At the outbreak of the most recent episode 
of violence in 1993, following the assassination of the country’s first Hutu president, 
Melchior Ndadaye, Hutu groups targeted Tutsi in retaliation throughout the country, killing 
30,000-50,000 Tutsi within weeks. In turn, the Tutsi-dominated army responded with 
indiscriminate and large-scale attacks on Hutu. In the years that followed, confrontations 
between rebel groups and the army ravaged communities throughout the country.     
Nevertheless, most of the violence concentrated around the nation’s capital, Bujumbura, as 
                                                 
11 The end of the conflict was officially sealed with a peace agreement signed in 2005. Yet, the intensity of 
conflict in the last 2 years was negligible as compared to the intensity in the first 11 years.  When constructing 
our variables on conflict and victimization, we focus on the incidents in the 1993-2003 period.  
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both rebels and the army fought over its control. Also, violence was less present in remote 
places such as communities at greater altitudes (Figure 1).  Burundi has only recently started 
to recover from this violence, which left over 300,000 Burundians dead and displaced 1.2 
million people (Ngaruko and Nkurinziza 2000). We recorded the number of confrontations 
between army and rebels as well as bouts of one-sided violence hitting communities without 
regard for the characteristics of their victims over the 1993-2003 period. In our sample, about 
two thirds of the communities experienced such attacks resulting in the death of up to 15% of 
the communities’ inhabitants.  
 
3.2 Experimental Games 
For our series of experiments we use adapted versions of well-established 
experimental game protocols. We implement a social orientation experiment, a risk 
experiment and a time preference experiment, to be implemented in this order.  In the risk 
experiments subjects face the possibility to make losses – as we elicit decisions in both the 
win and loss domain.  To avoid subjects making losses in the session (i.e., over all three 
games), we pay them a show-up fee of 2000 FBU.
12  
To measure social preferences we adapted the social value orientation experiment 
devised by Liebrand (1984).  In this experiment, subjects (denoted by i,j) are anonymously 
matched to another participant from their community (their ‘partners’), and make six choices 
between two own-other payoff combinations; A and B. The pairs of allocations lie on a circle 
in the positive quadrant, where the amount of money the decision maker allocates to himself 
(Si) is measured along the horizontal axis and the amount of money allocated to the other 
participant is measured along the vertical axis (Oi).
13  The radius of the circle is 250 FBU, so 
                                                 
12 USD 1 = 1,210 FBU (20 May 2009), which is roughly equal to a full day’s wage rate for unskilled labor. 
13 Originating in the social psychology literature this experiment is now frequently applied in the economics 
literature as well (see Offerman et al. 1996, Vyrastekova and van Soest 2007). In these versions subjects are 







2.  As a result, the total amount of money to be allocated (Si+Oi) is not 
constant across combinations.
14  Subject i’s earnings are equal to the amount of money 
allocated to himself (the sum of Si’s over the six choices), plus the amount of money allocated 
to him by his partner j in the experiment (the sum of Oj over the six choices).  If we take the 
ratio of the total amount of money a subject allocated to the partner (the sum of all Oi’s) and 
the total amount allocated to himself (the sum of Si’s), we obtain a measure of this subject’s 
social orientation.  This ranges from totally selfish (if the subject always chose the allocation 
with the highest payment for himself) to totally altruistic (if he always chose the option with 
the highest payment for his partner).  We rescale the results such that social orientation is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 denoting purely selfish preferences, 100 identifying 
the subject to be maximizing his partner’s payoff, and 50 identifying the social optimum (i.e., 
choosing allocations to maximize joint payoffs). On average we find a value of 27, indicating 
that most subjects tend to be fairly individualistic (Table 1). The subjects were not informed 
about their earnings in this experiment (the sum of Si+Oj over all 6 choices) until after the 
other two experiments had been completed.  
The second experiment of the session was the risk preferences experiment.  Here we 
used a game (based on Harbaugh et al. 2002)
 15 where subjects could choose between playing 
a simple gamble and receiving a specific amount of money with certainty. Participants were 
presented with 6 choice cards, each of which presented them the choice between A: receiving 
(or losing) an amount of money with certainty (y, that varied between the 6 choice cards), and 
B: participating in a game where they may either gain (lose) 2000 FBU with probability 0.3, 
                                                                                                                                                          
burden of making all 24 choices was too large for our (largely illiterate) subject pool.  We decided to just offer 
subjects pair-wise choices in the “first quadrant” of the social orientation circle––corresponding to positive 
amounts for both the giver and receiver. We thus reduced the cognitive burden imposed on our illiterate subjects 
at the cost of reduced precision with which pro-social preferences can be measured.  
14 See Appendix for example of record sheet and full choice pair table. 
15 We used an adapted version of a simple design for children by Harbaugh et al. (2002) which is well suited for 
illiterate people as it uses a simple trade-off and clear visual instruction.  Our use of the experiment differs 
slightly from Harbaugh et al. as we specifically use information from questions where the certainty equivalent is 
different from the expected value of the gamble.   
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or gain (lose) nothing with probability 0.7.  Hence, the expected absolute value of the gamble 
was always the same (600 FBU, which was an expected gain for three cards and an expected 
loss for the other three cards), whereas we varied the amount of money to be received with 
certainty (y).  For both gains and losses the certain bid (y) was lower, equal to, and higher than 
the expected value of the gamble.  As the certain payoff (y) in A increases, the gamble in B 
becomes less attractive.  The point at which a subject switches from the risky to the safe 
alternative allows us to determine her degree of risk aversion.
16   
The probabilities of the gamble (0.3 of winning/losing 2000 FBU, and 0.7 of receiving 
nothing) were represented visually using three black and seven white balls.  To illustrate the 
chances of winning/losing money, the ten balls were put into a bag in the presence of all 
participants in the session, and subsequently stirred.  Next, we drew one ball from the bag 
about ten times – with replacement – to show the participants that the likelihood of drawing a 
black ball (implying winning/losing money) was less than half the likelihood of drawing a 
white ball (resulting in zero payoffs). The choice cards displayed the options both numerically 
and graphically with each change in money stock represented by an equivalent number of 
banknotes. Payoffs for this second experiment were not determined until after the third 
experiment had been completed.  Then, payoffs were determined by first selecting which of 
the six cards was to be implemented.  Six numbered balls were put into a bag to randomly 
select one card to be played for payment. Those subjects who had chosen the safe option A 
were informed about the amount of money y, as stated on that card, they were to receive (or 
had to pay).  For those who had chosen the gamble, option B, the seven white balls and the 
three black balls were put into the bag to determine whether they would receive (have to pay) 
2000 FBU (when any of the three black balls were drawn), or whether they received nothing 
                                                 
16 See Appendix for record sheet and full choice pair table.  
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(if one of the seven white balls was drawn). Note that we made sure that at the end of the 
experiment all subjects had non-negative earnings because of the 2000 FBU show-up fee.
  
The third and final experiment aimed to gauge time preferences.  We presented 
subjects with a set of nine simple pair wise choices between two options: receiving an amount 
of money at some date in the near future, and receiving a larger sum at a later time.  The 
amounts of money were to be delivered by a trustworthy local NGO, Ligue ITEKA.  However 
future money is always less certain than instantaneous money.
17
   Consequently, we provided 
subjects with a choice between two future options – receiving money tomorrow, or in 15 days 
– rather than one “instant” versus one future income option (see Harrison et al. 2002).  The 
two options to choose between were A: receive 1000 BFU in one day, and B: receive 1000(1 
+ d) FBU in two weeks plus one day, with d equal to 0.00, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.10, 0.40, 0.70, 
and 1.00.
18
  Subsequently, at the highest interest rate subjects earned an additional 1000 FBU 
by waiting two weeks. In the experiment subjects were asked to identify their switching point 
from preferring A to preferring B.  Increasing the interest rate d over the nine decisions allows 
us to observe the point at which a subject switches from preferring 1000 FBU tomorrow to 
preferring 1000(1 + d) FBU in two weeks plus one day.  The switching point serves as a 
measure of the subject’s discount rate; the earlier people switch from A to B the more patient 
they are.  
After subjects completed all questions (and after having determined the payoffs for the 
social orientation game and the risk preference game), we randomly determined which pair-
wise choice was to be paid in the time preference experiment.  To do so, we put 9 numbered 
balls into a bag, and picked one randomly.  The option chosen for that question (i.e. A or B) 
then determined how much money was delivered, and when.  Then the participants were 
informed about their revenues in the social orientation game, the payments for the risk 
                                                 
17 Ligue ITEKA is a Burundian non-governmental organization with a solid reputation of being trustworthy 
amongst Burundians. It has a long history of operation as well as nationwide coverage in Burundi.  
18 See Appendix example of record sheets and full choice pair table.  
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preference game were determined using the procedure explained above, and they received the 
associated earnings, plus their show-up fee. The pay-off of the time preference game was 
placed in a sealed envelope and handed over to a representative of the regional office of the 
local non-governmental organization, while all participants received a receipt stating the 
amount of money they were entitled to.  At the relevant date (either the next day, or 15 days 
later), the representative went back to the community to deliver envelopes to the respective 
participants, in return for the their receipts.  To ascertain that the money envelopes were 
indeed delivered by our local organization, we checked whether all receipts were collected – 
which was indeed the case.  The participants were informed about this procedure in advance.    
 
3.3 Implementation 
The experiments were conducted during March-April 2009. Following an extensive training 
of our local experimenters
19, we ran several pilot tests to ensure that our typical participant 
was able to understand our experiments without much effort. As many of our participants had 
received little or no education, we followed a relatively simple design and our experimenters 
used clear and visual instructions to make it easier for illiterate subjects to understand the 
consequences of any decisions they made in the games. We tested comprehension by asking 
test questions before the start of each experiment.
20
 A day before the experiments, research 
coordinators contacted local government officials in each research site, and asked them to 
invite the household heads of the 2007 survey participants. The experiments started at 
approximately 9 A.M. the next day, and lasted about three hours. Each session started with a 
general introduction in which the participants were informed, among other things, that upon 
completion of the session they would receive a show-up fee of 2000 FBU plus or minus the 
amount of money they would gain or lose as a result of their decisions during the session.  
                                                 
19 The experiments were conducted in the local language Kirundi. 
20 To enhance understanding we also limited the group size to 10 participants and if needed experiments were 
conduced in two groups. Also, instructors we went though the experiments question by question.  
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The games were implemented by three teams, each with one instructor and two research 
assistants. Subjects who had difficulty completing record sheets by themselves were helped 
by research assistants who carefully avoided giving specific instructions about how to answer. 
The average experimental earnings for three games were about 6000 FBU (roughly 5 days 
wages for unskilled labor), including the 2000 FBU show-up fee.  
 
3.4 Exogeneity and selection bias 
The assumption underlying our empirical approach is that violence across and within 
communities was exogenous with respect to individual preferences.  However, any co-
variation of preferences and exposure to violence may be due to (i) non-random violence or 
(ii) non-random attrition in the sample.  
  Regarding the first, there is ample evidence highlighting the brutal and indiscriminate 
nature of the Burundi conflict (HRW 1998, Krueger and Krueger 2008; for a more detailed 
examination of the nature of violence in Burundi, refer to Voors and Bulte 2008).  Some 
communities were severely attacked, for example when the army raided whole communities 
in search of weapons, rebels and loyalists (HRW 1998, Krueger and Krueger 2007).   
Similarly, rebels indiscriminately attacked individuals and communities in search of supplies. 
We collected data on exposure to violence both at the household and community level (Table 
1).  For example, the community survey elicited information on the intensity of violence 
resulting from confrontations between the army and rebel groups as well as one-sided 
violence by either group.  We recorded the date and severity of the attacks, including the 
number of civilians killed or injured over the period 1993-2003.     
To statistically examine whether ‘selection into violence’ might bias our results we 
assess whether violence experienced by communities is associated with pre-war community 
characteristics; see Table 2.  Violence is measured as the number of attacks during 1993-2003  
16 
 
(column 1), and as the number of people dying in attacks in that period, expressed as a share 
in the total population (column 2).  In these two columns we find no significant correlation 
between our measure of violence and a broad range of pre-war community characteristics 
including, among others, average wealth
21, the fraction of votes for the assassinated president, 
and ethnic homogeneity.  Only two (exogenous) variables are correlated with the share of 
villagers killed – distance to Bujumbura, the nation’s capital, and altitude, a measure of 
geography (see also Figure 1).  We employ these variables as instruments for conflict 
intensity to attenuate any remaining endogeneity concerns and measurement error.  Below we 
will demonstrate that the instruments are not correlated with the error term of the second stage 
regressions. 
Second, we analyze whether households are selected into violence, or not.  In the third 
and fourth column of Table 2 we repeat the above analysis, but now at the household level.  
We have two proxies for household exposure to violence: (i) whether a physical attack 
happened to a household member and (ii) whether household members have been exposed to 
non-physical attacks (including theft, forced labor, etc.).  In columns (3) and (4) we 
demonstrate that neither variable is correlated with a range of household characteristics 
(income, gender, education, etc.).  The same applies to survey-based data that are related to 
the preferences we are interested in: (i) perceived trust levels (a measure of social capital as a 
proxy for social preferences), (ii) crop choice (proxy for risk preferences), and (iii) 
expenditures on farm improvements (proxy for time preferences--see section 4.3).
22  Taken 
together, the regression results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 2 support the anecdotal evidence 
that violence in the Burundi war committed by both soldiers and rebels was random.  
Next, to address sample attrition we analyze whether a non-random subset of the 
population was murdered or moved out in response to the threat of violence (and did not 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately our data lack pre-war income levels, instead we proxy wealth by average livestock ownership. 
22 These household data are not available for the pre-war period.  Instead we rely on early war data from our first 
survey wave, conducted in 1998.    
17 
 
return) between 1998 and 2009.
23  Some 14% of the households surveyed in 1998 were 
‘missing’ in 2009, which represents a modest attrition rate given the circumstances.  In 
column (5) of Table 2 we analyze whether these drop-out households differ statistically from 
the re-interviewed household in 2009.  We follow the approach taken by Fitzgerald et al. 
(1998) and estimate a probit model of 1998-2009 attrition on a range of 1998 household 
characteristics.  All but one variable enter non-significantly.  The one exception is gender of 
the household head.  According to our data, households headed by a male were less likely to 
be present in the 2009 survey than households headed by a female (the share of male-headed 
households dropped from 80% in 1998 to 60% in 2009).  We return to this issue in section 4. 
 
4. Conflict, Behavior and Preferences 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest considerable heterogeneity in experimental 
behavior.  In this section we investigate whether experimental behavior varies with exposure 
to conflict, and regress decisions made in the social, risk and time preference experiments on 
our measures of violence.  We include several household and community characteristics as 
controls, and also include regional fixed effects.
24 We focus primarily on the relationship 
between community exposure to violence and individual preferences.  The reason is that even 
if only a sub-set of individuals directly experienced acts of violence, the consequences may be 
felt throughout the community (Yehuba 2002).  Our main measure of violence comprises the 
total number of dead during 1993-2003 relative to population size in the community.   
                                                 
23 Unfortunately, we do not have data to explore this same issue for the entire duration of the war; from 1993 
until 2003.  Households that migrate in anticipation of violence may have different risk and social preferences 
than those households which stayed behind.  We use data from an alternative study to probe into this.  The 
Enquête Socio-Démographique, Santé et Reproduction (ESD-SR) was collected by a UN institution, and we use 
it to analyze whether migration during the early war period (1993-1998) is explained by community or 
household characteristics.  In this sample, 20% of households were not present in their village in 1998, and 
according to this sample both gender, literacy and age mattered for migration decisions.  However, for these 
villagers we do not know whether their village of origin indeed experienced conflict, and it is therefore not 
evident that migration of households affects the composition of conflict-ridden villages relative to those who 
escaped conflict. 
24 See appendix for variable definitions.  
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However, in some models we also include an index of individual level exposure to violence.  
Throughout we cluster standard errors at the community level to account for intra-community 
correlation.  
 
4.1 Conflict and Behavior 
We explore the relationship between conflict and behavior in the experimental games in 
Tables 3, 4 and 5.
25  In Table 3 we report the results for our measure for pro-social behavior.  
Across all OLS specifications we record a statistically significant and positive correlation 
between conflict intensity and altruistic behavior at the community level (column 1) as well as 
at the household level (columns 2-5). This is in line with earlier empirical survey work by 
Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009) and Blattman (2009) who report an increase in social 
cohesion and political participation in response to violence.  As discussed above, our findings 
also resonate with psychological studies into the effect of traumatic experiences on people’s 
attitudes.   
  Our results are robust to the inclusion of ethnicity fixed effects, as well as a series of 
other household and community controls and regional fixed effects (Table 3, columns 3 and 4 
respectively).
26  For example, social preferences are higher when respondents are literate, 
male, and own more land.  We find weak evidence that social preferences are declining in 
age.  Turning to the community level controls, social preferences are positively associated 
with ethnic homogeneity, and negatively associated with distance to the market and ongoing 
conflicts within the community over land.  The effect of market integration is consistent with 
Henrich et al. (2004), and the land conflict and ethnicity outcomes makes intuitive sense.  We 
                                                 
25 All regressions in Table (3)-(5) use OLS. As our dependent variables take only a limited number of values, we 
also estimate the models in columns (1)-(5) using an ordered probit specification. The results are qualitatively 
similar and available on request.  
26 In addition the coefficient on violence increases if controls are included. Following Bellows and Miguell 
(2009) this suggest that it is unlikely that omitted variable bias explains away the conflict effect (see also Altonji 
et al. 2005).   
19 
 
find that population density, average community income and land distribution are not 
correlated with social preferences. 
  Next, we employ a household level conflict variable, rather than a community-based 
measure.  For this purpose we have constructed a household victimization index
27 (Table 3, 
column 5).  We again find a positive correlation with social preferences, indicating that both 
individual and community level violence are associated with altruistic behavior.  This is 
consistent with the existing psychological evidence.    
OLS regression results for risk preferences are presented in Table 4.  Throughout we 
document a positive correlation between community level conflict intensity and risk seeking.  
This result is robust to including common controls and fixed effects  (columns 2–5).  In 
column (7) the dependent variable measures preferences over losses.  One key insight from 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) seminal paper is that people value changes in gains and 
losses differently.  In line with their work we find that people respond differently to changes 
in gains and losses: while conflict induces risk seeking over gains it does not affect attitudes 
towards losses. Though work by economists on shocks and risk preferences has so far been 
limited (Dercon 2008), this result suggests it may be a viable area for future research.  The 
pattern of responses provided in Table 4 is consistent with the psychologist’s model in case 
exposure to violence has invited sentiments of anger.  It is striking to observe that risk 
preferences are not (robustly) associated with any of the household or community-level 
controls.  
Finally, in Table 5 we summarize the impact of conflict on inter-temporal choices.  
The models suggest that exposure to conflict causes an increase in discount rates.  While the 
evidence seems more mixed, violence appears to make people less patient.  Again, this is not 
inconsistent with the psychologist’s model of interpreting traumatic events.   It is interesting 
                                                 
27 Our victimization index is an additive scale of exposure to a range of violence measures (rape, theft, forced 
labor, torture, ambushes). Since the absolute scale of this variable is arbitrary it is normalized to have a mean of 
zero and standard variation of one.  
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to note that time preferences are not associated with any of the household-level variables 
(including individual exposure to violence, when controlling for community attacks).  In 
contrast, several of the community variables enter significantly, communities with higher 
levels of ethnic homogeneity display lower discount rates. Yet, contrary to intuition, we find 
that discount rates are lower in communities with an unequal distribution of income and those 
with ongoing conflicts over land. 
To attenuate potential endogeneity and omitted variables concerns in Tables 3-5 we 
re-run our analysis using a 2SLS specification, where we use distance to Bujumbura and 
altitude as instruments for our conflict measures.  Results are reported in columns (6) in all 
three Tables.  Predicted violence is significant at the 1% level, and the value of the coefficient 
is larger than before.
28  Our identifying assumption is that these geography variables only 
affect the allocation of violence and have no direct impact on preferences.  If, however, 
distance to the capital is analogous to distance to markets then preferences are likely 
dependent on distances to Bujumbura (see Henrich et al. 2001).  Yet, direct effects of 
proximity to the capital are likely minimal as most farmers operate at subsistence level and 
sell goods at local markets, which often act as an intermediary for goods making their way to 
the capital as well.  These markets are close by in all communities in our sample (never over a 
2 hour walk away), reducing concerns about a correlation between geography and 
preferences.  Also, export crops production such as coffee is usually sold to local 
intermediates or washing stations. Statistically, this is conformed by the test statistics 
indicating that our excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous variable (see the 
high partial F values), and also that these instruments are correctly excluded from our second 
stage regression (the p-value of the Hansen J statistic is well above 0.10).    
                                                 
28 The 2SLS point estimate is somewhat larger than the OLS estimate. This is a common finding in cross-country 
studies, usually attributed to measurement error (biasing the OLS estimates towards zero).   
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Finally, to assess the magnitude of these effects, we report the coefficients of all 
significant variables in each of the Tables 3-5 after having standardized the explanatory 
variables such that they have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  These so-called 
beta coefficients are reported in column (7) in Tables 3 and 5, and in column (8) of Table 4.  
Clearly the impact of conflict dominates all other impacts. For example, the beta coefficient 
of violence in the social preference regression is 0.46, about three times as large as the beta 
coefficients of the other variables in the same column.   
 
4.2. True preference shifts versus changes in beliefs? 
Our results shed light on the consequences of conflict for growth.  Conflict induces people to 
make more pro-social choices and take more risky decisions in our experiments, but are also 
found to be more impatient.  What matters for development is behavior, and not the 
underlying preferences.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider whether the behavioral 
change that we document is due to a (true) preference shift.  Most of the literature ignores this 
issue, and simply interprets experimental play as reflecting underlying preferences (e.g., 
Henrich et al 2001, 2004, Carpenter and Cardenas 2008, Tanaka et al 2009, Croson and 
Gneezy 2009).  The results in Tables 3-5 are consistent with the notion that exposure to 
violence has altered preferences.  However, the observed change in behavior may also be due 
to the fact that victims and non-victims having been exposed to different opportunities for 
learning about their own latent preferences, or about heuristics regarding behavior in specific 
situations.  This is akin to questions about the effect of propaganda and advertisement – do 
they create new preferences, or do they appeal to latent preferences, or invite updating of 
preferences via the provision of new information?  While we cannot analyze this issue in 
detail, we explore it further by delving a little deeper into differences in means and variances 
between the victims and non-victims.   
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  In the top panel of Table 6 we compare sample means for communities that have and 
have not been exposed to violence.  Consistent with Tables 3-5 we find systematic 
differences.  We believe the systematic nature of the differences speaks against the 
interpretation that respondents have learned about their true preferences.  There is no reason 
to assume that a-priori (i.e. without exposure to conflict) respondents’ uninformed guesses 
about their true preferences would be systematically biased towards one direction or another.  
Hence, albeit tentatively, the systematic nature of the response supports the idea of a 
preference shift rather than the alternative explanation of preference discovering.  
Next, we tentatively explore whether the pattern of responses is consistent with the 
other alternative hypothesis – the idea that exposure to conflict induced learning about 
optimal behavior (adjusting heuristics), so that people “converge” towards a certain 
behavioral pattern.  In the second panel of Table 6 we run t-tests on the differences in 
variance between the two groups.  We find no significant difference in the variance of our 
preference parameters for social and time preference, which is at odds with the idea of 
learning about ‘best behavior’.  However, for risk preference we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of unequal variances.   
 
4.3 Robustness 
In this section we report the outcomes of a series of robustness analyses.  First, we explore 
whether the differences in experimental play translate into systematic differences in behavior 
in real life. We estimate several alternative models and summarize our findings in Tables 7 
and 8.  In Table 7 we replace our experimental variables with survey-based social-, risk- and 
time preference proxies.  In column (1) the dependent variable is a social capital index in the 
spirit of Narayan and Pritchett (1999).  This index comprises a weighted (and normalized) 
scale of respondents’ participation in community organizations and the degree of  
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membership.  Consistent with our experimental variables we find a positive correlation with 
exposure to violence.  In column (2) we proxy for risk attitudes by using a common measure 
of crop choice.  If conflict alters risk preferences we would expect an effect on investment and 
asset portfolio choice––skewing resources to more risky and profitable activities.  We use our 
1998-2007 panel to estimate the effect of conflict on the share of cash crops to total 
production, and find that households in regions exposed to greater levels of violence cultivate 
relatively more cash crops.  (Recall that earlier we demonstrated that cash crops did not invite 
conflict – see Table 2 columns 3-5).  Again this result is consistent with the experimental 
evidence. Lastly, in column (3) we use a measure of long-term investments – the share of 
expenditures on farm building improvements – as our dependent variable.  The assumption is 
that a greater share of durable investments reflects greater patience.  Again we find our 
experimental results reflected in the survey data: households affected by greater levels of 
conflict invest less in farm buildings.   
  To further assess the robustness of our findings we return to the possible bias 
introduced by selection in to our sample.  Table 2, column (5) showed that men may be 
underrepresented in our sample (some 40% of households were female headed in 2009).   
Hence, correlation between gender and preferences may bias our estimates in Tables 3-5.  In 
columns (4)-(6) of Table 7 we re-estimate our 2SLS models on a restricted sample of male 
respondents who were present in both 1998 and 2009, and find that for social and risk 
preferences the results go through as before, with only minimal differences in the coefficients. 
  In Table 8 we assess whether other types of shocks such as natural disasters (drought 
and excess rainfall) and plant diseases affect preferences as well.  Again we estimate the 
models explaining experimental play.  Interestingly, we find no consistent set of significant 
effects of such shocks on preferences.  Natural disasters and diseases do not produce the same 
traumatic responses as exposure to conflict—attenuating the risk that we are picking up  
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omitted variable effects.  The one exception is a correlation between a major plant diseases 
and social preferences.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The literature on the consequences of civil wars has often emphasized its detrimental effects 
on households’ ability to cope.  According to this view, such civil wars may invite poverty 
traps.  However, this pessimistic view on development has come under new scrutiny from a 
few recent careful micro level studies suggesting that exposure to conflict is not necessarily 
detrimental for development and may contribute to social capital (see Bellows and Miguell 
2006, 2009, Blattman 2009). Yet, social preferences are but one of a set of preferences likely 
affected by conflict and of interest to development economists and practitioners. We extend 
upon earlier work by (i) including risk and time preferences in our analysis, and (ii) gauging 
such preferences with a series of incentive-compatible field experiments (rather than via a 
survey approach).  
In this paper we set out to investigate the impact of conflict on social, risks and time 
preferences and use data from a series of economic experiments using 300 respondents in 35 
randomly selected communities in Burundi.  We find that conflict is robustly correlated with 
preferences. Econometric analysis reveals that individuals in communities which were 
exposed to greater levels of violence display more altruistic behavior to their neighbors, are 
more risk seeking and have higher discount rates.  
The evidence documented in the various tables is consistent with the idea that 
preferences of people are endogenous and respond to experiences or the context.  While we 
cannot rule out that behavioral differences in experimental play are due to learning effects 
invited by exposure to conflict – learning about own preferences or those of others, and about 
consequences of behaviors over a range of contexts – we believe that the behavioral patterns  
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(including higher order terms such as the variance) do not generally support such an 
interpretation.  Of course our natural experiment approach implies imperfect control, and 
cleanly separating preference shifts from learning effects is not possible.  The benefit of our 
approach is that we are able to analyze the response to an event of first-order salience.   
Analysts routinely trade-off control versus the relevance of the context when conducting 
experiments (e.g. List 2007). 
A key finding of this paper is that temporary shocks have long-term consequences: 
civil war violence that occurred between 1993 and 2003 has a clear impact on individual 
behavior in 2009. These consequences may even prove to be permanent if they invite 
preference shifts. Our evidence for Burundi suggests that the net effect on development is 
unclear.  While exposure to violence causes pro-social behavior and encourages risk taking, 
arguably positive features for development at least within certain bounds, it also seems to 
trigger impatience.  As impatience discourages savings it could drag down investment levels 
also in the presence of imperfect capital markets (as obviously prevailing in Burundi).  If so, 
the net effect on the ability of communities to rebound after conflict is ambiguous.   
Nevertheless, the results may partially explain the pattern of recovery observed in many post-
conflict settings, and thereby provide new evidence against pessimistic views on the 
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level mean  std.  dev.  min  max 
Panel A: Preferences           
Social preferences [0-100]  298  35  27.34      28.10   0  100 
Risk preferences Gains  271  35  4.11  2.08  1  6 
Risk preferences Losses  259  35  4.83  1.91  1  6 
Discount rate (%)  285  35  39.67  41.26  0  100 
           
Panel B: Conflict variables             
Relative number of dead in attacks (%)    35  2.35  4.48  0  15.63 
Individual victimization index  299  35  0  1  -0.50  3.86 
           
Panel C: Household variables             
Respondent is literate  296  35  0.52  0.50  0  1.00 
Respondent  age  298  35  44.91 15.76 14.00  90.00 
Respondent is male  298  35  0.61  0.49  0  1.00 
Total land holdings per capita (ha
2)  292  35  5.43 5.08 0.10 34.25 
Respondent is livestock farmer (1993)  300  35  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Perceived trust level (1998)  300  35  4.69  2.16  1  10 
Social capital index (2007)  299  35  0  1  -0.47  4.49 
Respondent is cash crop farmer (1998)  300  35  0.60  0.49  0  1 
Respondent is cash crop farmer (2007)  300  35  0.35  0.48  0  1 
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 1998)  295  35  398.20  375.16  0  5000 
Investments farm buildings (FBU, 2007)   300  35  221.86  1001.42     0  12155.87 
           
Panel D: Community variables             
Land Gini coefficient    35  0.30  0.20  0  0.54 
Distance to market     35  2.85  0.72  1  6 
Conflict over land (% yes)    35  0.25  0.15  0  0.60 
Ethnic homogeneity    35  0.88 0.15 0.30  1.00 
Population density 1990 (log)    35  5.47  0.48  4.20  6.11 
Population density 2008  (log)    35  5.79  0.44  4.50  6.49 
Per capita total expenditure 1998 (log)    35  8.57  0.70  5.17  10.70 
Per capita total expenditure 2007 (log)    35  9.24  0.47  8.09  10.40 
Severe draught (% yes)    35  0.63  0.48  0  1 
Access rain (% yes)    35  0.63  0.48  0  1 
Manioc disease (% yes)    35  0.90  0.29  0  1 
Upcoming ceremony (% yes)    35  0.40  0.49  0  1 
Distance to Bujumbura (km)    35  93.17  34.53  39.5  167 






Table 2 Exogeneity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable:  Attack during 
1993-2003 
Rel. number of 
dead in attacks 
1993-2003 







in 1998 and 
2009 
 Probit  OLS  Probit Probit  Probit
Community variables         
Average literacy household head  -0.593  -5.943       
 (1.148)  (3.479)       
Average age household head  -0.002  0.0823       
 (0.043)  (0.144)       
Percent male  -0.368  1.268       
 (1.723)  (6.927)       
Livestock farmer (1993)  2.350  5.636       
 (1.908)  (5.608)       
Density in 1990 (log)  0.185  0.761       
 (0.573)  (1.866)       
Ethnic homogeneity (1993) 0.015  0.026      
 (0.020)  (0.060)       
Fraction of votes for Ndadaye (1993)  -0.011  0.025       
 (0.020)  (0.061)       
Distance to Bujumbura (km, log)    -5.749*       
   (3.160)       
Altitude (m,
 log)   -17.360*       
   (8.889)       
          
Relative number of dead in          0.0255 
attacks 1993-2003         (0.0189) 
         
Household variables         
Literacy     -0.041 -0.0283  0.312 
     (0.192) (0.156)  (0.270) 
Age     0.006 -0.0008  -0.00239 
     (0.007) (0.0060)  (0.00660) 
Gender       0.125 -0.176  -0.794*** 
     (0.263) (0.222)  (0.239) 
Livestock farmer (1993)      0.225 0.0748  0.0660 
     (0.216) (0.181)  (0.252) 
Ethnicity     0.0684 0.0453   
     (0.167) (0.142)   
Total expenditures (1998)      0.253 0.160  -0.193 
     (0.223) (0.186)  (0.164) 
Perceived trust level (1998)      -0.0052 -0.0109   
     (0.0431) (0.0378)   
Share of cash crops in total       -0.366 0.170  -0.0973 
production (1998)      (0.417) (0.307)  (0.412) 
Expenditures farm improvement       0.0843 0.0356  0.0296 
(1998)     (0.0902)  (0.0803)  (0.0605) 
          
Constant 0.302  145.7*  0.457  1.686  2.295 
 (4.755)  (75.45)  (0.390)  (1.452)  (1.448) 
         
FE no  no  yes  yes  yes 
N 35  35  239  239  279 
adj. R
2   0.13       
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable in column 
(3) is a dummy, 1 if respondent was interviewed in both 1998 and 2007, zero else; in column (4) is a dummy, 1 
if respondent was interviewed in both 2007 and 2009, zero else; in column (5) is a dummy, 1 if respondent was 
in village during 1998, zero else.  
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Table 3 Conflict and social preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Relative number of   0.143*  0.136*  0.241***  0.255***  0.259***  0.422***  0.464*** 
dead in attacks (%)  (0.0792)  (0.0687) (0.0676) (0.0738)  (0.072)  (0.115)   
Individual  victimization        0.499***    
Index       (0.254)    
         
Household variables         
Respondent  is  literate      1.338** 1.330** 1.430** 1.436***  0.174*** 
      (0.533) (0.527) (0.523) (0.521)   
Respondent age      -0.0301*  -0.0291*  -0.031*  -0.0315*  -0.119* 
     (0.0157)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.0161)   
Respondent  is  male      0.882* 0.914* 0.866* 1.047**  0.123** 
      (0.503) (0.500) (0.481) (0.450)   
Total land holdings per       0.110***  0.095**  0.099**  0.108**  0.130** 
Capita     (0.0389)  (0.0381)  (0.038)  (0.0497)   
          
Community variables          
Land  Gini  coefficient      -1.379 -1.170 -0.542 -2.097 -0.101 
      (1.415) (1.291) (1.264) (1.366)   
Distance to market      -0.858**  -0.853**  -0.768*  -1.06***  -0.181*** 
      (0.387) (0.398) (0.405) (0.370)   
Conflict over land      -3.556**  -3.127**  -3.152**  -4.45***  -0.167*** 
      (1.667) (1.444) (1.385) (1.668)   
Ethnic  homogeneity      0.037** 0.040** 0.034**  0.029*  0.106* 
     (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.0160)  (0.016)   
Population  density      0.893 0.996 1.087  1.399**  0.150* 
      (0.687) (0.866) (0.850) (0.706)   
Per capita total       0.101  0.103  -0.0347  -0.143  -0.018 
expenditure      (0.484) (0.595) (0.600) (0.560)   
         
Constant 41.19***  41.23***  34.59*** 34.11*** 35.24*** 35.89***   
 (0.356)  (0.338)  (6.804)  (6.828) (6.826) (5.860)   
         
Regional  FE  no no no yes yes yes yes 
N  35  298 288 288 288 288 289 
adj. R
2  0.063 0.019 0.138 0.136 0.197 0.115   
         
First stage instruments         
Distance to Bujumbura (log)            -4.996***   
        ( 0 . 6 9 5 )    
Altitude  (log)        -22.41***   
        ( 3 . 4 0 1 )    
         
Hansen  J,  p-value        0.35   
Partial  F        44.01   
Dependent variable: Degree of altruism scale 0-100. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
community level. Column (1): dependent variable is community average. Column (6): excluded instruments of 




Table 4  Conflict and risk preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
  gains gains gains gains gains  gains  losses  gains 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS  2SLS 
Relative number of   0.11***  0.10***  0.0614*  0.0659*  0.0656*  0.114*  0.0261  0.247* 
dead in attacks (%)  (0.042)  (0.033)  (0.0328) (0.0378) (0.0377)  (0.0699)  (0.0366)   
Individual           -0.0914       
victimization Index          (0.0999)       
           
Household variable            
Respondent literate      -0.404  -0.398 -0.407  -0.351  -0.191 -0.086 
      (0.253) (0.256) (0.258)  (0.269)  (0.308)   
Respondent  age      0.0105 0.0107 0.0114 0.00945 -0.0085 0.073 
      (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0068)  (0.0074)  (0.0105)   
Respondent is male      -0.288  -0.257 -0.256  -0.208 -0.0456  -0.050 
      (0.268) (0.267) (0.268)  (0.267)  (0.231)   
Total land holdings       -0.0309  -0.0384 -0.0395  -0.0347  -0.0298 -0.086 
Per Capita      (0.0273)  (0.0285) (0.0280)  (0.0250)  (0.0288)   
            
Community variable            
Land Gini       -1.153  -1.020  -1.111 -1.310* 0.125  -0.125* 
Coefficient      (0.769) (0.886) (0.901)  (0.758)  (0.806)   
Distance to market      0.237  0.254  0.237  0.189  0.207  0.066 
      (0.190) (0.178) (0.176)  (0.209)  (0.225)   
Conflict over land      0.132  0.359  0.358  -0.0068  1.153  0.000 
      (1.243) (1.288) (1.299)  (1.059)  (1.210)   
Ethnic  homogeneity      0.0122 0.0133 0.0143  0.0101  0.0001 0.075 
      (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086)  (0.0114)  (0.0143)   
Population density      0.505*  0.480  0.473  0.579  0.685  0.125 
      (0.291) (0.367) (0.363)  (0.426)  (0.453)   
Per capita total       -0.370*  -0.340 -0.319  -0.413  0.0433 -0.096 
Expenditure      (0.197) (0.218) (0.215)  (0.284)  (0.355)   
            
Constant  3.81***  3.88***  2.974 2.933 2.728  3.581  0.351   
 (0.189)  (0.201)  (2.596)  (2.591) (2.603)  (3.169)  (3.776)   
            
Regional FE  no  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
N  35 271 261 261 261  261  251 262 
adj. R
2  0.16 0.042 0.118 0.115 0.113  0.109  0.09   
                
First stage instruments              
Distance to Bujumbura (log)            -4.996***     
           (0.695)     
Altitude (log)            -22.41***     
           (3.401)     
                
Hansen J, p-value            0.82     
Partial F            39.31     
Dependent variable ranges 1 (risk averse)  - 6 (risk loving). Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
community level. Excluded instruments of first stage reported only. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Column (1): dependent variable is community average. Column (8) contains beta coefficients. 
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Table 5 Conflict and time preferences 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Relative number of   0.572  0.760  1.468**  1.359**  1.366**  3.42***  0.383*** 
dead in attacks (%)  (0.591)  (0.474)  (0.618)  (0.566) (0.571) (1.249)   
Individual           3.185     
victimization  Index         (2.143)    
            
Household variables            
Respondent  literate      -4.301  -3.982 -3.791 -2.709 -0.033 
      (5.349)  (5.332) (5.345) (5.387)   
Respondent  age      -0.143  -0.146 -0.174 -0.185 -0.070 
      (0.168)  (0.166) (0.171) (0.172)   
Respondent is male      -2.649  -3.185 -3.320 -1.589 -0.019 
      (4.758)  (4.595) (4.569) (5.291)   
Total land holdings        0.206  0.417  0.474  0.572  0.071 
Per  capita      (0.454)  (0.446) (0.447) (0.502)   
             
Community variables             
Land  Gini  coefficient      -56.5***  -62.0*** -59.2*** -73.9***  -0.358*** 
      (15.32)  (15.55) (15.84) (14.41)   
Distance to market      2.500  2.686  2.976  0.0537  0.001 
      (3.539)  (3.991) (4.008) (4.166)   
Conflict over land      -29.24  -37.04**  -37.43**  -54.5***  -0.204*** 
      (19.43)  (17.66) (17.27) (18.73)   
Ethnic  homogeneity      -0.554** -0.626*** -0.659***  -0.77*** -0.280*** 
      (0.226)  (0.187) (0.181) (0.189)   
Population density      7.699  8.285  8.978  13.50*  0.145* 
      (6.509)  (8.106) (8.150) (7.284)   
Per capita total       10.37  9.685  9.036  6.198  0.071 
expenditure      (7.011)  (5.882) (5.897) (5.283)   
            
Constant 39.32***  37.83***  -26.48  -25.45  -20.80  1.119   
  (4.280)  (3.967)  (77.03)  (72.39) (73.12) (59.86)   
            
Regional FE  no  no  no  yes  Yes  yes  yes 
N  35 285  276  276 276 276 276 
adj. R
2  0.01 0.004  0.104  0.115 0.117 0.082   
            
First stage instruments            
Distance to Bujumbura (log)            -4.996***  -4.996*** 
           (0.695)  (0.695) 
Altitude (log)            -22.41***  -22.41*** 
           (3.401)  (3.401) 
            
Hansen J, p-value            0.44  0.44 
Partial F            48.65  48.65 
Dependent variable: discount rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at community level. Excluded 
instruments of first stage reported only. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Column (1): dependent variable is 




 Table 6 Student t-test on means and variances of preferences  
 social  risk  time 
      
Community mean       
Below mean violence  25.38 (1.51)  3.82 (0.12)  37.27 (2.35) 
Above mean violence  35.59 (3.69)  4.97 (0.21)  48.30 (4.65) 
Difference -10.21  -1.15  -11.45 
p-value 0.00  0.00  0.04 
      
Variance around community mean       
Below mean violence   1.75  1.04  5.80 
Above mean violence  1.86  0.60  5.94 
Difference  -0.11    0.44  -0.15 




Table 7 Conflict and behavior 






















 OLS  Tobit  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 2SLS
Relative number of   0.0377**  0.00783*  -21.28**  0.567***  0.328**  0.575 
dead in attacks (%)  (0.0155)  (0.00474) (10.39)  (0.198)  (0.144) (1.956) 
           
Household variables          
Respondent  is  literate  0.376**  0.0500  119.1 2.244*** 0.107 -9.137 
 (0.145)  (0.0377)  (90.63) (0.752) (0.422)  (7.105) 
         
Respondent age  -0.00162  0.00174  0.323  -0.0465**  0.00247  -0.0487 
 (0.00403)  (0.00143)  (3.271)  (0.0219) (0.0133) (0.236) 
         
Respondent is male  -0.139  0.0609  -30.83       
 (0.140)  (0.0415)  (72.38)       
         
Total land holdings per   0.0270*  0.0126***  -5.933  0.110*  -0.0147  0.355 
capita (0.0142)  (0.00460)  (9.504) (0.0646)  (0.0338)  (0.567) 
           
Community variables          
Land Gini coefficient  -0.0157  0.0940*  128.3  0.135  -1.098  -89.39*** 
 (0.330)  (0.0541)  (200.1)  (1.871)  (1.198)  (18.56) 
         
Distance to market  -0.0913  -0.492***  74.36  -1.334**  -0.251  7.122 
 (0.0996)  (0.138)  (51.83) (0.539) (0.329)  (4.964) 
         
Conflict over land  -0.988**  0.00289  519.8  -4.596**  -0.236  -82.32*** 
 (0.479)  (0.0411)  (353.9)  (2.260)  (1.397)  (23.33) 
         
Ethnic homogeneity  -0.00182  -0.620***  -5.222*  0.0155  -0.00612  -0.805*** 
 (0.00656)  (0.206)  (2.850)  (0.0211) (0.0161) (0.227) 
         
Population density  0.0870  0.00219  -89.96  0.919  0.601  14.14* 
 (0.188)  (0.00211)  (139.4) (0.892) (0.520)  (7.956) 
         
Per capita total   -0.266*  0.295***  132.1*  0.0986  -0.452  4.742 
expenditure (0.144)  (0.101)  (69.95) (0.790) (0.414)  (6.359) 
         
Constant 2.252  0.255***  -564.5  39.04***  5.979  2.785 
 (1.864)  (0.0287)  (1059.4) (7.981)  (4.601) (72.82) 
Fixed effects  yes  yes yes yes yes yes
N  283  288 289 169 148  161 
adj. R
2 0.029    0.005  0.023  -0.153  0.186 
Hansen J, p-value        0.30  0.83  0.55 
Partial F        17.88  9.22  17.09 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. First stage instruments distance and 
altitude, results not shown. Column (2) is unconditional tobit regression with fixed effects, potentially inducing 
some bias in our estimate; regression using random effects is qualitatively similar.  
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Table 8 Other type shocks and preferences 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 social  risk  Time 
      
Severe draught  -1.290  -0.689  -0.334 
 (1.453)  (0.597)  (0.676) 
      
Access rain   0.0936  -0.223  0.0516 
 (1.057)  (0.439)  (0.435) 
      
Manioc crop disease  -2.142**  -0.400  -0.861 
 (1.011)  (0.552)  (0.992) 
      
Upcoming ceremony      -0.768 
     (0.795) 
      
N 288  261  276 
Table summarizes coefficients of separate regressions including controls and fixed effects. Robust standard 






Figure 1. Number of casualties in surveyed communities as a result of attacks by army or rebels by 





Table A1 Choice Pairs Task 1 
 A  B 
Question  Self Other Self Other 
1 0 250  60  240 
2  60  240 120 220 
3 120 220 180 180 
4 180 180 220 120 
5 220 120 240  60 
6 240 60 250  0 
 
Table A2 Choice Pairs Task 2 
  Certain   gamble 
Question gain/loss  p gain/loss 
1 500  0.3  2000 
2 600  0.3  2000 
3 700  0.3  2000 
4 -500  0.3  -2000 
5 -600  0.3  -2000 
6 -700  0.3  -2000 
 
Table A3 Choice Pairs Task 3 
Question Tomorrow 
In two weeks 
and one day  d 
1 1000  1000  0 
2 1000  1010 0.01 
3 1000  1020 0.02 
4 1000  1050 0.05 
5 1000  1100  0.1 
6 1000  1400  0.4 
7 1000  1700  0.7 
8 1000  2000  1 




Example Record Sheet Task 1 
 
 
Example Record Sheet Task 2 
 
 










•  Number of dead in community attacks relative tot population size   Reports number of 
dead on colline as a consequence of confrontations between rebels and army as well as 
one sided violence between 1993-2003 divided by population size, as stated by local 
administrators (BCS).   
•  Household level victimization index is an additive index of the exposure of any household 
member to either rape, theft, forced labor, torture, ambushed. Since the absolute scale of 
this variable is arbitrary it is normalized to have a mean of zero and standard variation of 
one (BPHS). 
 
Household and community variables  
•  Age: Age of head of household, measured in years (BPHS and ESD-SR) . 
•  Respondent is male:  Gender of head of household. In household level regressions 
variables is dummy variable taking unity if head of household is male, zero else.  In 
community level regressions, variable household dummy’s are averaged over number of 
households per community (BPHS and ESD-SR). 
•  Respondent is literate:  Literacy of head of household.  In household level regressions 
variables is dummy variable taking unity if head of household is literate, zero else. In 
community level regressions, variable household dummy’s are averaged over number of 
households per community (BPHS and ESD-SR). 
•  Land size per capita (m
2):  Total land size of household i in square meters, divided by 
number of adult equivalents present in household i (BPHS).  
•  Distance to market:  Distance to main agricultural market where food and non-food items 
are traded, measured in time intervals of 15 minutes, where  5 ,..., 1 = t  (BCS). 
•  Prewar income (1993): In household level regressions variables is i-th household 
indication of perceived level of wealth in 1993 on a scale, ranging 1 (very poor)-6 (very 
rich). In community level regression, variable for j -th community is created by averaging 
over all community households (BPHS). 
•  Perceived trust level 1998 and 2007. Perceived level of trust in community members, 
rated on a 10 point scale 1 (very low)-10 (very high) (BPHS). 
•  Livestock farmer 1993: In household level regressions variables is dummy taking unity if 
household owned livestock in 1993, zero else. In community level regression, variable 
for j -th community is created by averaging over all community households (BEES and 
ESD-SR). 
•  Cash crops relative to total production. Share of cash crops (coffee, tea, tobacco and 
cotton) produced relative to total production (BPHS). 
•  Land Gini coefficient:  Variable based on household land holdings. Community level Gini 
coefficient is created by  ∫ − =
1
0 ) ( 2 1 dX X L G (BPHS). 
•  Population density (1990 and 2008):  Number of people in community per square 
kilometer (MPDRN). 
•  Vote in favor of president Ndadaye: Percentage of votes in favor of Ndadaye at the 
commune level during the presidential elections in 1993. 
•  Distance to Bujumbura. Distance of j -th community to capital in kilometers.  
•  Altitude. Average altitude of j -th community (MPDRN). 
•  Land conflicts: Dummy taking unity if there are land conflicts in community (BPHS). 
•  Ethnic homogeneity: Percentage of Hutu population in community (BEES).   
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•  Community income: Variable is the aggregated income of per capita expenditure for all 
goods purchased over a 15 day period valued at local market prices and divided by the 
adult equivalents of household i (BPHS). 
•  Severe draught: Dummy taking unity if household was exposed to severe draught in past 
three years (2007-2009) (BEES). 
•  Access rain: Dummy taking unity if household was exposed to access rain in past three 
years (2007-2009) (BEES).  
•  Manioc crop disease: Dummy taking unity if household was exposed to cassava crop 
disease in past three years (2007-2009) (BEES). 
•  Upcoming ceremony: Dummy taking unity if household was expecting a ceremony in the 
near future (BEES). 
 
Experimental variables 
•  Social preferences: Degree of altruism resulting from 6 choices between participant (S) 




the resulting degree of altruism is α =  tan (O/S), with 37.5 < α < 52.5. Item rescaled to 0 
< α < 100. In community level regression, variable for j -th community is created by 
averaging over all community households. 
•  Risk preferences: Switch point [0 (risk averse), … , 6 (risk loving)] between risky gain (or 
loss) with a probability p = 0.3, and certain (y) gain (or loss). In community level 
regression, variable for j -th community is created by averaging over all community 
households.  
•  Time preferences: Discount rate is switch point between receiving 1000 FBU in one day  
and receiving (1+ d)1000 FBU in two weeks and one day, d = [0, … , 100]. In community 




BPHS. Burundi Priority Household Survey 2007 
BCS. Burundi Community Survey 2007 
BEES. Burundi Experiments Exit Survey 2009 
MPDRN. Monographies Communales Burundi. Ministre de la Planification du 
Developpement et de la Reconstruction Nationale, Bujumbura, 2006 
ESD-SR. Enquête Socio-Démographique, Santé et Reproduction 2002 